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Recent Decisions
CONFLICTS-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-
CONTINUING JURISDICTION
A North Carolina court, supervising a testamentary trust, re-
moved the trustee for misconduct. Trustee had left the state with
the trust assets and was served both by publication and personally
in the District of Columbia in compliance with North Carolina
statutes. The successor trustee brought an action in the District
Court of the District of Columbia for possession of the trust assets
and an accounting. In this action, deposed trustee attacked the
North Carolina removal proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. The
district court granted summary judgment for the successor trustee.
Held, on appeal, that the North Carolina proceeding was entitled to
full faith and credit. The proceeding was quasi in rem and the
trustee, already before the court in the general proceeding, is en-
titled to no more than constructive service. Judgment affirmed.
Boone v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 163 F. 2d 809 (App. D.C.
1947).
In North Carolina, jurisdiction for removal of a testamentary
trustee is in equity. Cheshire v. 1st Presbyterian Church, 221 N.C.
205, 19 S.E. 2d 855 (1942); In re Smith's Estate, 200 N.C. 272, 156
S.E. 494 (1931). The North Carolina court, being a court of equity,
had inherent power to remove a trustee for cause. North Carolina
R.R. v. Wilson, 81 N.C. 221 (1879); Franz v. Buder, 34 F. 2d 353
(C.C.A. 8th 1929); 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 2504 (4th ed.
1918).
If both the res and the trustee are in another state when an
action to remove the trustee is instituted, a judgment of removal
upon constructive service is ineffective and not entitled to full
faith and credit. Parker v. Kelley, 166 Fed. 968 (W.D.N.Y. 1908).
But once jurisdiction of the trust res has been acquired by the
court, this jurisdiction is not lost by the improper removal of the
res from its custody. Pennington v. Smith, 69 Fed. 188 (S.D.N.Y.
1895); 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 3142 (5th ed. 1925). Accord, The Rio
Grande, 23 Wall. 458 (U.S. 1874). The North Carolina removal
proceeding against the trustee with respect to the res was quasi in
rem. Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886); Combs v. Combs,
249 Ky. 155, 60 S.W. 2d 368 (1933); Gassert v. Strong, 38 Mont. 18, 98
Pac. 497 (1908). Since there was continuing jurisdiction over the
res, due process was satisfied if the trustee received notice by con-
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structive service. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1945); Michigan
Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913); Letcher's Trustee v. German
National Bank, 134 Ky. 24, 119 S.W. 236, (1904); RESTATEMENT, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS §§75, 76 (1934).
By local law, title may vest in the successor trustee by the
order of appointment without a conveyance from the predecessor
trustee. 1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-227 (1943); State v. Underwood, 86
P. 2d 707 (Wyo. 1939); Coster v. Coster, 125 App. Div. 516, 109 N.Y.
Supp. 798 (1st Dept. 1908); SCOTT, TRUSTS §109 (Supp. 1946) ; BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §532 (1935); RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §109 (1935).
Having established the jurisdiction of the state court over the
res, and the reasonableness of the notice, federal courts must give
full faith and credit to the proceeding of the state court. U.S.
CONST. Art. IV, §1; REV. STAT. §905 (2d ed. 1878), 28 U.S.C. §687
(1940); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932); Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Ins. Co. v. Harris, 97 U.S. 331
(1877); Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481 (U.S. 1813). When the court
proceeding vests title of property, over which the court has juris-
diction, in the successor trustee, the technical distinction between
an equity decree and a judgment at law is not controlling. Cf. Fall
v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Meentz v. Comstock, 230 Iowa 63, 296
N.W. 721 (1941); Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa 607, 173 N.W. 127
(1919); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAwS, §§449, 450 (1934); Good-
rich, Five Years of Conflict of Laws, 32 VA. L. REV. 295, 328 (1946).
As an additional reason why the deposed trustee was not denied
due process of law by constructive service, the court pointed out
that there is continuing in personam jurisdiction over a trustee who
is administering a trust under supervision of the court, since the
administration is an integral part of the original proceeding. Ac-
cord, Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, supra; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457 (1940); Hatch v. Hatch, 192 Atl. 241 (N.J. Eq. 1937); Moore v.
Superior Ct., 203 Cal. 238, 263 Pac. 1009 (1928); State v. District Ct.,
46 Mont. 425, 128 Pac. 590 (1912). Jurisdiction acquired by consent
or submission of the defendant is not lost by his subsequent attempt
to withdraw his consent or submission. Michigan Trust Co. v.
Ferry, supra; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195 (U.S. 1860).
The desirability of the result of the principal case is obvious,
lse testamentary trustees by their own wrongful acts could fore-
stall removal by leaving the jurisdiction with the trust assets.
Don W. Sears
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-NEW YORK OBSCENE
PRINTS AND ARTICLES STATUTE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The appellant was a bookdealer who sold books and magazines
containing stories dealing with crime and bloodshed. He was con-
victed of a violation of Section 1141 (2) of the New York Penal
Statute which read in part, "a person who ... has in his possession
with intent to sell ... any book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper, or
other printed paper devoted to the publication and principally
made up of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of blood-
shed, lust or crimes; . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor." Upon appeal
the New York Appellate Court construed the statute as prohibiting
distribution of magazines principally made up of criminal news or
stories of deeds of bloodshed or lust so massed as to become vehicles
for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person and
upheld the conviction under this interpretation. Held, the statute,
as construed, violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States because it is so vague and indefinite as to
permit within the scope of its language the punishment of incidents
fairly within the protection of the guarantee of free speech and
press. Judgment reversed. Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton, JJ.,
dissented. Winters v. New York, 68 Sup. Ct. 665 (1948).
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment voids
any penal law that fails to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt
because people must be given fair notice of what acts to avoid.
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914). The
test to be applied is whether the statute forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of ordinary intelligence
are compelled to guess at its meaning and must necessarily differ
as to its application. If so, the statute subjects the actor to an
unreasonable risk and violates due process. Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). The standard is satisfied if
the language defining the abuse has a well-known technical or
special meaning or a well-settled common law meaning. Connally
v. General Construction Co., supra; Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246
U.S. 343 (1918); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
In the principal case the Court, at page 672, stated that the
statute was not an effective notice of new crime. But the Court did
not choose to rest its decision on the "void for vagueness" rule alone.
In addition, it held that the statute abridged freedom of the press
because it prohibited acts fairly within the guarantee. In so doing
the Court cast grave doubts upon the validity of similar statutes
existing in twenty states including Ohio. OHIo GEN. CODE §13035.
The publication and distribution of religious pamphlets are
within the constitutional guarantee of free speech and press. Lovell
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v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). The discussion and publica-
tion of political doctrines and opinions are also within the guarantee
so long as they do not advocate the overthrow of the government by
violence. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937). By this decision the protection of freedom of the press has
been extended to include magazines of no value to society which
were apparently printed and sold solely for profit. The Court states
that constitutional protection for a free press is not limited to the
exposition of ideas yet it has been stated that the press "compre-
hends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of informa-
tion and opinion." Lovell v. City of Griffin, supra, at 452. It is
difficult to conceive of a magazine which is of no value to society
that could be a vehicle of information and opinion. Nor did the
decision in the Herndon case, in which the rule applied in the princi-
pal case was enunciated, extend to such publications as those in
question. In that case the Court was dealing with the right to ad-
vocate political views. Clearly the present case is an extension of
the application of the rule of the Herndon case.
The inclination of the Court in the past has been to uphold
state statutes that were somewhat vague if they dealt with crimes
difficult to define. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, supra; Waters-Pierce
Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909). The policy formulated by this
decision requires .that the "void for vagueness" rule be strictly
applied to those statutes restricting freedom of speech and press
and freedom of the press now includes publications which have no
value for society. It is evident that the court believes that no ex-
ception to the guarantee of free speech and press should be made
regardless of how trivial the exception may seem. On page 671
the majority state, "The present case as to a vague statute abridging
free speech involves the circulation of only vulgar magazine. The
next may call for a decision as to the expression of political views
in the light of a statute intended to punish subversive activities."
Walter P. Davidson
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING COMMIVEEES
The Committee on Un-American Activities was duly authorized
under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 to conduct investi-
gations of " (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American
propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within
the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that
is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and at-
tacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our
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Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that
would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." 60 STAT.
812, 828. The appellant was summoned as a witness by the Sub-
Committee of the Committee on Un-American Activities, to be
sworn and to testify before the Sub-Committee on matters of in-
quiry referred to the Committee. He appeared pursuant to a sub-
poena but refused to be sworn and give any testimony. The appel-
lant was indicted under a statute which reads in so far as here
pertinent:
Every person who having been summoned as a wit-
ness by the authority of either House of Congress to give
testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under
inquiry before either House . . . or any Committee of
either House of Congress, wilfully makes default, or who,
having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent
to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor,... 2 U.S.C. §192 (1940).
Trial was by jury and after motions to set aside the verdict
and in arrest of judgment had been denied, sentence was imposed.
Appeal was taken, raising inter alia, the issue involving the con-
stitutionality of the authorizing statute and its effect with regard
to its application in the given set of circumstances. Held, the
power of a Congressional Committee to investigate is not limited
by Congress' power to legislate, and even though the authorizing
statute is so vague as to permit inquiry into matters concerning
the advocacy of peaceful changes of the form of government, as
well as revolutionary, the appellant is in no position to so contend
because he refused to answer any questions. United States v.
Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82 (1947) (one judge dissenting).
The majority of the court based its decision on five proposi-
tions:
First, even though the authorizing statute is so vague as to
give a witness before the Committee no criteria as to what is
pertinent to the inquiry and what is not, the fact that some ques-
tions that were pertinent might have and probably would have
been asked placed the witness in the position of being required to
at least answer the pertinent inquiries. Reference is made to the
statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in Nash v. United States, 229 U.S.
373, 377 (1913), that: ". . . the law is full of instances where a
man's fate depends upon his estimating rightly, that is, as a jury
subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree."
Second, the doctrine of Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1880), that neither house possesses a "general power of making
inquiry into the private affairs of the citizens," but each house is
[Vol. 9
RECENT DECISIONS
limited to inquiries relating to matters within its jurisdiction and
in respect of which it may validly act, was held to be not appli-
cable on the ground that an inquiry into the private affairs of a
private citizen when the matter being inquired into may potenti-
ally affect the survival of the Government is not, in fact, an in-
quiry into the personal affairs per se but only an inquiry into per-
sonal affairs to the extent such individuals are a part of the Gov-
ernment as a whole. See Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the
Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARv. L. Rav. 153, 219
(1927).
Third, even though the inquiry may expose the political beliefs
and affiliations of individuals and groups to public view (and to
the inquirees irreparable damage), and even though the members
of the Committee and the Committee itself have stated the purpose
thereof is not in fact legislative, and even though the Committee
has proposed little or no legislation, the fact that the authorizing
statute contains the declaration of Congress that the information
sought is for legislative purposes is conclusive as to the purpose of
the Committe. Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279
U.S. 597, 619 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176-180
(1927).
Fourth, the absence of a presumption of constitutionality where
civil liberties are concerned, Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945),
is not applicable where the legislation has not yet been enacted, the
court saying, "When speech . . clearly presents an immediate
danger to National security, the protection of the First Amendment
ceases. Congress can then legislate. It is not for the courts to as-
sume in advance that Congress will pass any legislation in viola-
tion of the First Amendment." The power of a Congressional Com-
mittee to investigate is not limited by Congress' power to legislate.
Fifth, as the Congressional power of investigation is as flexible
as its power of legislation, the fact that it centers investigation on
one problem or even one facet of a problem is not discriminatory,
even though other problems equally serious are present and not
being investigated. Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61 (1911).
The dissenting judge bases his argument on the proposition
that if the power of the legislature to inquire into the private
opinion of an individual transcends either that of the judiciary or
the power to legislate in a similar area, the Bill of Rights has a
vulnerable area and its guaranties are effectively emasculated.
Basic to his argument is the proposition that there are few, if any,
rights of the people guarded by the fundamental law of the country
transcending in importance the right to be exempt from all un-
authorized, arbitrary and unreasonable inquiry and disclosure in
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respect to their private affairs. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1880). In support of his position several separate and distinct
arguments are advanced.
First, the power and duty of the courts to scrutinize Congres-
sional investigations lest they transcend constitutional limitations
is supported by both precedent and text writers. Kilbourn v.
Thompson, supra; Constitutional Limitations on the un-American
Activities Committee, 47 COL. L. REv. 416 (1947).
Second, the statute authorizing the inquiry is general in terms
and makes no attempt to define the pertinent inquiries of Congress,
and all attempts to explain the meaning of the key word "un-
American" have been avoided or opposed, nor has any legislation
come from the Committee itself. The statute as here used is penal
in nature and should be set forth with clarity so that the person
to whom it applies may determine what conduct is legal and what
conduct is illegal. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946);
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
Third, before utterances can be punished it should appear
clearly that the substantive evils resulting therefrom present an
imminent danger to the welfare of the state. Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941). The fear of fear should not be confused with
the danger itself. Ogden, The Dies Committee, 2d Rev. Ed. 1945.
When Congress can attack under the authorizing statute any con-
duct departing from the status quo, or norm, there can be no justifi-
cation for such wide reaches of authority; especially when it poses
no great difficulty to provide for an investigation of proper scope
which would clearly be constitutional. Dunne v. United States, 138
F. 2d 137 (C.C.A. 8th 1943). The fact that under the present statute
clearly dangerous activity may be investigated cannot sustain the
entirety of the statute when under it innocent conduct can likewise
be invaded and exposed. Such a thesis would make the Congres-
sional power of investigation limitless.
The dissenting judge concludes his argument with the self
evident proposition that any investigation dealing with constitu-
tional liberties carries inherently its own self destructive power if
not constitutionally conducted inasmuch as the success of a democ-
racy lies in the confidence of the people in the conduct of its public
office. James F. Shumaker
CORPORATIONS-SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHT TO BRING A DERIVATIVE SUIT
Plaintiffs, minority shareholders of callable preferred stock, in-
stituted a derivative suit. The defendant corporation thereupon
redeemed their shares and moved to dismiss the action. Held, thal
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elimination of plaintiffs as shareholders did not extinguish their
right to bring a derivative suit. Motion denied. Kantor v. Stendig,
118 N.Y.L.J. 1557, 2 P-H CoRP. SERV. 20113 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1947).
One characteristic of the shareholders', or derivative, suit is that
the corporation must be named as a party defendant. Davenport v.
Dows, 18 Wall. 627 (U.S. 1874); e.g., Dean v. Kellogg, 294 Mich.
200, 292 N.W. 704 (1940); Deming v. Beatty, 72 Kan. 614, 84
Pac. 385 (1906); Converse v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 209
Mass. 539, 95 N.E. 929 (1911); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 341 (Rev.
ed. 1946). The judgment should conclude not only the shareholders
prosecuting the suit and the culpable individuals, but it should also
conclude the corporation. The possibility that the culpable individ-
uals may suffer judgment for the full amount of the corporate
wrong in a suit brought by shareholders and then be subjected to
another suit on the same facts brought by the corporation in its own
right is one that is foreign to our concepts of justice. The most
effective way to prevent this possibility from materializing is to
name the corporation a party to the action, and this is the principal
reason joinder is required. Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie
National Securities Corp., 154 Misc. 615, 276 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct.
1933); Turner v. United Mineral Lands Corp., 308 Mass. 531, 33 N.E.
2d 282 (1941).
The shareholders bringing a derivative suit are the only plain-
tiffs appearing on the petition. Having divorced the plaintiffs in the
instant case from their status in the corporation as shareholders,
defendants contended no one was left to prosecute the suit. But in a
realistic sense the corporation is also a plaintiff; it is the beneficial
plaintiff, for any sum recovered in the derivative suit becomes its
property. Monahan v. Kenny, 248 App. Div. 159, 288 N.Y. Supp. 323
(1st Dep't 1936) ; Potter v. Walker, 252 App. Div. 244, 293 N.Y. Supp.
161 (1st Dep't 1937), aff'd, 276 N.Y. 15 (1937); Coxe v. Hart, 53 Mich.
557, 19 N.W. 183 (1884); Wasmer v. Massillon Iron Co., 7 Ohio App.
488, 40 Ohio C.C. 575 (1916); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 666 (1936).
Shareholders, including those bringing the suit, receive no part of
the money judgment. They benefit indirectly by the increment in
the book value of their shares. Hayden v. Perfection Cooler Co.,
227 Mass. 589, 116 N.E. 871 (1917); Harden v. Eastern States Public
Service Co., 14 Del. Ch. 156, 122 Atl. 705 (1923); STEVENS, CoRPoRA-
TIONS 657 (1936); Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit-Corporate and In-
dividual Grievances, 33 YALE LAW J. 580 (1924).
Professor Ballantine states the rule for determining sufficiency
of interest to sue in a derivative suit as follows: "In order that a
person may maintain a suit as shareholder ... he must be an owner
of shares or have some beneficial interest therein when suit is
brought and, also, while it is pending so that lie will benefit by the
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relief given." BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 350 (Rev. ed. 1946). Thus,
in a case involving an involuntary sale of shares by levy under a
writ of execution, a derivative suit commenced by the former share-
holder was dismissed. Polish American Publishing Co. v. Wojick,
280 Mich. 466, 273 N.W. 771 (1937); Cf. Brewer v. Dodge, 28 Mich.
359 (1873). Professor Ballantine's statement of the rule has by no
means been given universal acceptance, however; by the weight of
authority, it is required only that the plaintiff be a shareholder
when the suit is instituted. Fry v. Rush, 63 Kan. 429, 436, 65 Pac.
701, 703 (1901); Hanna v. Lyon, 179 N.Y. 107, 71 N.E. 778 (1904);
Zinn v. Baxter, 65 Ohio St. 341, 369, 62 N.E. 327, 332 (1901); 6 THomp-
SON, CORPORATIONS 534 (3rd ed. 1927). Even under the Ballantine
rule, an exception would probably be made where the corporation
redeems the plaintiffs' shares for the express purpose of avoiding
derivative suit. Otherwise, the very wrongdoers who made institu-
tion of the suit necessary could, by virtue of their control of the
corporation, defeat shareholders' attempts to force rectification.
Donald W. Fisher
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-INTENT TO KILL
The accused intentionally anesthetized an eleven year old girl by
administering chloroform from a bottle labeled "poison." He then
raped her. After this act he returned to his couch in the living room
Later, hearing a moan in the room where his victim and her sistel
were sleeping, he returned to their room and unsuccessfully at-
tempted to awaken his victim. She was taken to a hospital anc
pronounced dead. The accused was indicted for forcible rape and foi
first degree murder. The indictments were consolidated, a jur
trial was waived, and the accused was tried to a court consisting o:
three judges. He was found guilty of rape and of murder in th(
first degree by means of poisoning while in the commission of rape
The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Held, oi
appeal to the Supreme Court, conviction affirmed. To warrant
conviction of murder in the first degree, all the elements of thi
crime as defined by Section 12400, General Code, including th,
element of intent to kill, must be established beyond a reasonabli
doubt. The trial judges sitting as judge and jury had found all th,
necessary elements, including intent to kill, to have been prove(
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salter, 149 Ohio St. 264, 78 N.E
2d 575 (1948).
Ohio has no crimes except as provided by statute. Fouts i
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State, 8 Ohio St. 98, 111 (1857); Stockum v. State, 106 Ohio St. 249,
139 N.E. 855 (1922). Murder in the first degree is defined by Section
12400, General Code as follows:
"Whoever, purposely, and either of deliberate and premeditated
malice, or by means of poison, or in perpetrating or attempting to-
perpetrate rape, arson, robbery or burglary, kills another is guilty
of murder in the first degree and shall be punished by death unless
the jury trying the accused recommend mercy. in which case the
punishment shall be imprisonment in the penitentiary during life."
At common law, malice was implied as a matter of law if a
homicide occurred during commission of a felony, and such a killing
was murder whether or not intent to kill existed. CLARK AND
MARSHALL, LAW OF CRImEs §245 (4th ed. 1940); MILLER, CRI1MINAL
LAW 269 (1934). The usual construction of the Ohio statute has
been that the word purposely qualifies all that follows it and that
the killing of another is not murder unless done with intent to kill.
State v. Turner, Wright 20, 27 (Ohio 1831) ; Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio
St. 131, 190 (1857), (construction of statute substantially the same
as present statute); Fouts v. State, 8 Ohio St. 98, 112 (1857);
Stephens v. State, 42 Ohio St. 150 (1884); Jones v. State, 51 Ohio St.
331, 341 (1894) ; Munday v. State, 5 C.C. (N.S.) 656, 662, 26 O.C. 712,
716 (1904), aff'd, 72 Ohio St. 614, 76 N.E. 1132 (1905); Turk v. State,
48 Ohio App. 489, 194 N.E. 425 (1934), affd, 129 Ohio St. 245, 194
N.E. 453 (1935).
The majority opinion concedes that to sustain a conviction of
murder in the first degree there must be an intentional killing, but
that the intent could be inferred from knowingly and purposely
using chloroform when accused knew that it was poison and that
death might result from its use. The Robbins case, the leading case
in Ohio construing the statutory definition of first degree murder,
was distinguished on the ground that no instructions to a jury were
involved in the instant case. The concurring opinion rejected the
views expressed in the majority opinion of the Robbins case and
stated that "murder in the first degree results from purposely kill-
ing another with deliberate and premeditated malice, or from kill-
ing another by purposely administering poison, or in the purposeful
perpetration or attempting to perpetrate rape, etc." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) Substantially the same language is embodied in the syllabus
of the case, although the syllabus is a direct quotation of the "rule"
set out in the majority opinion. A vigorous dissent is noteworthy
for its careful analysis of the syntactical structure of the statute.
The dissenting judges contended that there was no evidence in the
record of an intent to kill and that therefore the conviction was
erroneous.
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The majority opinion is unassailable because it carefully pointed
out that intent to kill had been found by the trial judges. But it is
stated that the syllabus of the case is the law in Ohio. 94 Ohio St.
Preliminary p. ix (1917) (Reporter's Note); State v. Hauser, 101
Ohio St. 404, 131 N.E. 66 (1920); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baillie,
112 Ohio St. 567, 148 N.E. 233 (1925) ; Thackery v. Helfrich, 123 Ohio
St. 334, 175 N.E. 449 (1931); 136 Ohio St. Preliminary p. lxxii (1940)
(Clerk's Note); Note, 14 U. oF CrN. L. REV. 572 (1940). Therefore
it is submitted that the result in the instant case is a departure from
the interpretation of the statute as developed by past decisions,
despite the effort to "distinguish" such cases. It is possible that the
Salter case might be used as a precedent for a conviction of first
degree murder where intent to kill was absent.
Robert J. Lynn
DAMAGES-BREACH OF CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL CONTRACT
Plaintiff, a correspondence school, was prevented from fully
performing its contract for instruction by the refusal of the defen-
dant to continue his course of study. Plaintiff recovered a judgment
in a justice of the peace court for the balance due on the contract.
On appeal and retrial in the court of common pleas judgment was
affirmed, but only nominal damages were allowed. Plaintiff ap-
pealed. Held, judgment affirmed. Refrigeration & Air Condition-
ing Institute v. Rine, 80 Ohio App. 317, 75 N.E. 2d 473 (1946).
The sole issue raised on appeal was the determination of the
proper measure of damages. The principal case cited with approval
Michigan decisions to the effect that the plaintiff may recover only
the cost of his services and materials, together with the profit he
would have taken from the contract, had it been fully performed.
Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud, 248 Mich. 85, 226 N.W. 883
(1929).
However, a number of jurisdictions permit recovery of the full
contract price. Massachusetts courts permit such recovery on the
theory that the correspondence school contract consists of indepen-
dent covenants. International Text-Book Co. v. Martin, 221 Mass. 1,
108 N.E. 469 (1915). Other courts state that such contracts are en-
tire, and, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to the consideration
agreed upon unless the defendant can show facts in mitigation of
the damages. International Text-Book Co. v. Martin, 82 Neb. 403,
117 N.W. 994 (1908); International Correspondence School, Inc. v.
Crabtree, 162 Tenn. 70, 34 S.W. 2d 447 (1931).
The particular elements recoverable in an action on the contract
are expenditures toward performance and profits contemplated
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under the contract. Expenditures recoverable are, first, "the reason-
able value" of goods delivered and services rendered; second, any
definite expenditure made toward further performance; third, any
expenditure or loss incurred in undertaking and preparing to per-
form the contract.
It is the established rule in Ohio that only actual damages are
recoverable in an action on the contract (in the absence of specific
provision of law for allowance of punitive damages), and in no case
is the plaintiff to be placed in a better position by reason of the
defendant's breach. Cleveland Co. v. Standard Amusement Co. 103
Ohio St. 382, 133 N.E. 615 (1921) ; Doolittle & Chamberlain v. McCul-
lough, 12 Ohio St. 360 (1861). It is to be noted that unless the
allowance for that part of the contract performed is taken to be the
cost of performance, rather than the reasonable value of perform-
ance, the plaintiff would be more than compensated for his loss,
since he is entitled to profits as well as expenses. However, the
plaintiff may, if the reasonable value of his goods and services ex-
ceeds the cost to him by more than his margin of profit, disregard
the contract and sue in quantum meruit, in which case the reason-
able value is the proper measure of recovery. Cleveland Co. v.
Standard, Amusement Co., supra; Wellston Coal Co. v. Franklin
Paper Co., 57 Ohio St. 182, 48 N.E. 888 (1897).
The modern view, affirmed in the principal case, is that profits
may be recovered when not speculative, contingent, or uncertain.
Such recovery is limited to the profits possible under the contract
and is measured by the difference between the contract price and
the estimated cost of full performance after deduction of the cost
of completing performance. Buchholz v. Green Brothers Co., 272
Mass 49, 172 N.E. 101 (1930).
The Ohio court has adopted the view set forth above as the
correct application of the principle of compensation. Yet when the
plaintiff fails to prove actual damage from the defendant's breach,
only nominal damages may be recovered. Thus, as in the instant
case the burden of proving damage is placed upon the party best
able to produce the necessary facts. Cf. Dale System v. Wichroski,
320 Mass. 319, 69 N.E. 2d 241 (1946) ; McNulty v. Whitney, 273 Mass.
494, 174 N.E. 121 (1930).
Charles E. Westervelt, Jr.
DIvoRcE - CONDONATION BY COHABITATION
A husband sued his wife for divorce and clearly established
the ground of adultery. Defendant alleged condonation as a de-
fense and proved that the parties had continued to occupy the
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same house after plaintiff had obtained full knowledge of defend-
ant's infidelity. Defendant's claim that an act of marital inter-
course had been committed during this period was denied by
plaintiff. Held, divorce denied. Huffine v. Huffine, 74 N.E. 2d 764
(Ct. of C.P., Van Wert County, Ohio, 1947).
Condonation is generally defined as the conditional forgiveness
of a matrimonial offense by the aggrieved spouse. 27 C.J.S. DIVORCE
§59. It is an affirmative defense and must be specifically alleged.
Winnard v. Winnard, 62 Ohio App. 351, 23 N.E. 2d 977 (1939). Sexual
intercourse is not an essential element of condonation but it is con-
clusive proof thereof. Phinizy v. Phinizy, 154 Ga. 199, 114 S.E. 193
(1922). In the principal case, although no prior Ohio case had so
held, the court agreed with the weight of authority that a single
act of intercourse constitutes condonation. Shackleton v. Shackle-
ton, 48 N.J. Eq. 364, 21 Atl. 935 (1891); Shirey v. Shirey, 87 Ark.
175, 112 S.W. 369 (1908); 14 Cyc. 641; 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND Di-
VORCE, §282 (1891); but cf. Drew v. Drew, 250 Mass. 41, 144 N.E. 763
(1924) (single act of intercourse is only evidence of an intention to
forgive). A single act of sexual intercourse is insufficient as con-
donation under CAL. CIV. CODE §116 (1941). Bohnert v. Pohnert, 95
Cal. 444, 30 Pac. 590 (1892). One Ohio court quoted favorably from
Collins v. Collins, 194 La. 446, 193 So. 702 (1940), where a single act
of intercourse was held sufficient. Mears v. Mears, 15 Ohio Supp.
61, 30 Ohio Op. 177 (1945). (Ct. of C.P., Tuscarawas County, Ohio,
1945).
In the principal case the court was faced with the problem of
whether an act of intercourse had occurred. The court, at page
768, said that "although there should be no presumption that the
plaintiff and defendant, living under the same roof during the
pendency of a divorce action have continued relations, nevertheless
where the defendant claims condonation ... her testimony is suffi-
ciently corroborated by the fact that the parties have resided in
the same house." It is difficult to see just how the above statement
is anything other than the presumption which at the outset the
court undertook to deny. Burns v. Burns, 60 Ind. 259 (1877). Had
the court applied the rebuttable presumption that married people
living in the same house reside on terms of matrimonial cohabita-
tion, it would have been in accord with the decided weight of
authority in this country. Pepin v. Pepin, 206 N. Y. Supp. 732, 123
N.Y. Misc. 888 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Todd v. Todd, 37 Atl. 766 (N.J. Ch.
1897) ; Lee v. Lee, 51 Ill. App. 565 (1893); 27 C.J.S. DIVORCE §61 (d).
Contra: Denison v. Denison, 4 Wash. 705, 30 Pac. 1100 (1892). See
14 Cyc. 641 where the presumption is said to be limited to cases in
which the parties occupy the same room and bed.
Dictum in the Huffine case states that it works no hardship on
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the plaintiff to hold that he dwells in the same house with the of-
fending spouse at his peril, since the law provides means by which
the parties can be separated. OHIo GEN. CODE §11994; In re Cattell,
146 Ohio St. 112, 64 N.E. 2d 416 (1945). However, it is not in every
case that a plaintiff can be expected to abandon the home, particu-
larly when there exists an acute housing shortage. There may be
other considerations inducing plaintiff to remain in the same house
such as the protection of children and the safeguarding of property.
Sayles v. Sayles, 41 R.I. 170, 103 Atl. 225 (1918) (to obtain custody
of the children); Guthrie v. Guthrie, 26 Mo. App. 566 (1887) (plain-
tiff returned to nurse defendant-husband). See Toulson v. Toulson,
93 Md. 754, 50 Atl. 401 (1901).
It is believed that a plaintiff should be able to remain in the
same house with the offending spouse without being presumed to
have forgiven the defendant's transgressions, and thus to have lost
his cause of action for a divorce.
William M. Cromer
EMINENT DoVAiN - JUST COMPENSATION FOR TEMPORARY
SEIZURE OF STRIKEBOUND FERRIES
Complainant's ferry boats, connecting arterial highways across
Hampton Roads, Virginia, were idle because of a labor strike. On
February 22, 1946, under authority of an act of the General Assem-
bly of Virginia (Acts 1946 c. 39) granting power of eminent domain
for temporary seizure "Whenever the owner or operator of any
ferry ... is unable for any reason to operate [the ferry] . . .," the
State Highway Commissioner took control and began operation of
complainant's docks and ferries. Complainant sought, as compen-
sation for the seizure, net profits resulting from the Highway Com-
missioner's operation. The Commissioner contended the proper
measure of compensation was six per centum interest on $240,000,
the value of the property as assessed for tax purposes, plus an
allowance for wear and tear. Profits realized by the state for the
period in controversy totalled $400,000. Held, that just compensa-
tion in temporary eminent domain seizure is fair rental value with
reference to the value of the property and the earning capacity at
the time of taking; that a company which is not a going concern
at the time of taking may not have, as the measure of just com-
pensation, profit realized by the sovereign, in the use of the prop-
erty for the public welfare. Anderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Co., 186
Va. 481, 43 S.E. 2d 10 (1947).
While the Federal Constitution guarantees "just compensation,"
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it does not define the term. But established doctrine has it that
compensation is deemed to be just which represents the value of
the condemned property at the time of the taking. 2 BONBRIGHT,
VALUATION OF PROPERTY 408 (1st ed. 1937). Fundamental in judicial
determination of value is Justice Holmes' test: "What has the
owner lost? Not, what has the taker gained?" Boston Chamber of
Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1909). The usual method
of the courts in arriving at the loss suffered by the owner is, in the
case of a permanent seizure, to determine a fair market value.
Mississippi and Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 408
(1878). A fair rental value is the corresponding criterion in the case
of a temporary seizure. Egan v. Philadelphia, 109 Pa. Super. 271,
164 Atl. 813 (1933). But cf. General Motors Corp. v. United States,
323 U.S. 373 (1945).
The basic problem in the principal case is the extent to which
profits earned as a result of seizure by the state shall be a factor
in the determination of a fair rental value. The owner is entitled
to all elements of value inhering in the property at the time of tak-
ing, considering all uses for which it is suitable. Mississippi and Rum
River Boom Co. v. Patterson, supra; Appalachian Power Co. v. John-
son, 137 Va. 12, 119 S.E. 253 (1923). But the value to be ascertained
does not include any element resulting subsequent to or because
of the taking. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1933). Conse-
quential loss of business profits as such is not allowable. Mitchell
v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1924). However present value of
clearly to-be-expected future earnings may be considered, Brooklyn
Eastern District Terminal v. City of New York, 139 F. 2d 1007
(C.C.A. 2d 1944), and loss of a franchise to charge tolls through
seizure of a dam is a compensable loss, the value of which is re-
flected by the profits inuring from the right to charge tolls. Monon-
gahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
The principal case is decided ultimately on the ground that
although earning capacity is a factor to be considered in the deter-
mination of fair rental value, unless the property seized is that of
a going concern, that factor adds nothing to the value of what the
owner has lost. By this reasoning the court escapes the rule of
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, supra, relied upon by
the dissent.
Allowing the owner the profit while the state assumes the risks
of business enterprise would tend to discourage the owner's con-
summating an agreement with his striking employees. Yet, as the
majority assumed, the best interests of the public are subserved by
speedy settlement of strikes. Pointing in the same direction are
incentive considerations of an even larger order. Under traditional
economic theory the justification for the profit system is to provide
[Vol. 9
RECENT DECISIONS
business incentive. 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 409 (ist
ed. 1937). Profit, therefore, should be realized only if it supplies
this incentive. Realization of profit from the temporary seizure of
property which would remain unproductive but for the seizure fails
to satisfy this condition.
On the other hand extremely low compensation places the
owner in a disadvantageous position for collective bargaining. Ap-
parently the Virginia Legislature anticipated this dilemma and in
January, 1947 enacted a comprehensive statute (Acts 1947, c. 9)
authorizing the seizure of any public utility in the interest of the
public welfare. The Act provides that the state should reimburse
itself for all expenses of operation and should thereafter retain 15%
of the net income, paying the remaining 85% to the utility owner
"as compensation for the use of its established business, its facilities
and properties."
James T. Lynn, Jr.
EQUITY - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF OPTION TO RENEW LEASE
Plaintiff leased a storeroom for a period of two years. The lease
contained an option to renew, by giving notice, at a rental to be
agreed upon by the parties. Plaintiff gave proper notice but de-
fendant refused to carry out the covenant. Plaintiff brought an
action for specific performance. Judgment of the trial court refus-
ing specific performance because of the uncertainty of the option
was affirmed by the court of appeals. The plaintiff appealed to the
supreme court. Held, reversed and specific performance granted.
It was implicit that the rental should be for a reasonable amount.
Moss v. Olson, 148 Ohio St. 625, 76 N.E. 2d 875 (1947).
Some authorities indicate that a greater degree of certainty is
required for the enforcement of a contract in equity than is required
for the collection of damages on a contract at law. Minnesota
Tribune Co. ?.. Associated Press, 83 Fed. 350 (C.C.A. 8th 1897); 5
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1424 (Rev. ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS §370, comment b; COOK, CASES ON EQUITY 590 n. 23a (3d ed.
1940); POMEROY, SPECIFIc PERFORMANCE §159 (3d ed. 1926). How-
ever, another line of reasoning declares that if the contract is suffi-
ciently definite for the jury to assess damages, it is sufficiently defi-
nitive for specific performance. Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40
N.E. 1044 (1895); WALSH, EQUITY 329 (1930).
With respect to leases, the general rule is that an option to re-
new at a rental to be agreed upon is too indefinite for enforcement.
Candler v. Smith, 168 Ga. 276, 147 S.E. 552 (1929); Giglio v. Saia,
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140 Miss. 769, 106 So. 513 (1926). But some courts recognizing the
practical business utility of such clauses, have interpreted them as
anticipating a reasonable rental under the circumstances. Diettrich
v. Newberry Co., 172 Wash. 18, 19 P. 2d 115 (1933); Edwards v.
Tobin, 132 Ore. 38, 284 Pac. 562 (1930).
If that which is sought to be fixed by future agreement is an
essential element of the contract, no legal obligation can arise until
the agreement is consummated. Wade v. Lutterlah, 196 N.C. 116,
144 S.E. 694 (1928); St. Regis Paper Co. v. Hubbs & H. Paper Co.,
235 N.Y. 30, 138 N.E. 495 (1923) ; Denton v. Booth, 202 Mich. 215, 168
N.W. 491 (1918); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §45 (Rev. ed. 1937). Thus,
if a legal duty has not arisen because the agreement is indefinite
and uncertain, there can be no right, and if there be no right, there
necessarily can be no remedy. Courts differ on the question as to
whether the fixing of the rental is an essential element of the con-
tract. For examples of courts holding the agreement to be an essen-
tial element of the contract see Metcalf Auto Co. v. Norton, 119 Me.
103, 109 Atl. 384 (1920); Sammis v. Huntington, 186 App. Div. 463,
174 N.Y. Supp. 610 (2d Dep't 1919); Duffield v. Whitlock, 26 Wend.
55 (N.Y. 1841). The court in the principal case held that the fixing
of the rental was not an essential element of the contract and upon
the giving of proper notice, the identical lease was thereby extended
at a reasonable rental. Accord, Edwards v. Tobin, supra; Kauffman
v. Liggett, 209 Pa. 87, 58 Atl. 129 (1904); Town of Bristol v. Bristol
& Warren Waterworks, 19 R.I. 413, 34 Atl. 359 (1896).
The dissent took the view that enforcement of the option was
contingent upon the agreement of the parties, and such condition
precedent not having been met, the state, acting through the courts,
should not have made a contract where none in fact existed.
William J. Lee, Jr.
LABOR LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - LABOR DISPUTE AND
PICKETING AS FREE SPEECH IN OHIO
Plaintiff operated an automobile sales agency and a garage
under an open shop. Defendant union conducted an organizing
campaign, and six of plaintiff's employees joined. Defendant began
negotiations for a union shop; an election was had which resulted
in the decisive vote of 13 to 2 against the union. Defendant, there-
upon, stated that plaintiff's establishment would be picketed and
closed. A few days later some 100 pickets, none of whom were em-
ployees, were milling around plaintiff's building. The picketing, di-
rected by the union, was accompanied by violence. Plaintiff ob-
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tained a temporary restraining order enjoining all picketing pending
final hearing. Held, on final hearing, a labor dispute may exist
in the absence of disagreement between an employer and his em-
ployees, and picketing to publicize that controversy is entitled to
protection of free speech; but because of the past violence, certain
limitations were imposed on future picketing. Jones, Inc. V. Inter-
national Association of Machinists, 49 Ohio L. Abs. 97, 75 N.E. 2d
446 (C.P. 1947).
Ohio courts for many years have held that peaceful picketing
during a strike may not be enjoined. La France Co. v. International
Electrical Workers, 108 Ohio St. 61, 140 N.E. 899 (1923). But to
enjoy the right of peaceful picketing, a trade dispute was required
to exist. La France case, supra; Crosby v. Rath, 136 Ohio St. 352,
25 N.E. 2d 934 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 690 (1941). A trade
dispute existed only when there was a direct controversy between
an employer and his employees. La France case, supra; Crosby v.
Rath, supra. See notes, 2 OHmO ST. L.J. 301 (1936); 6 Oio ST. L.J.
334 (1940); 7 Omo ST. L.J. 454 (1941).
The United States Supreme Court has identified picketing as
free speech. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); A. F. of L.
v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
By virtue of the doctrine that picketing is an object of free
speech, the United States Supreme Court has limited the power of
both state legislatures and, state judiciaries to impair that right,
and in marking out the permissible limits of economic conflict, has
made it clear that the existence or non-existence of a labor dispute
is no longer a valid limitation. "A state cannot exclude working men
from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by
drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and
workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly
employed by him." A. F. of L. v. Swing, supra, at 326. By this doc-
trine, the right of free speech guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment rendered a state court powerless, notwithstanding the absence
of a labor dispute, to enjoin peaceful picketing. Bakery Drivers v.
Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); accord, Naprawa v. Chicago Flat Jani-
tors' Union, 315 Ill. App. 328, 43.N.E. 2d 198 (1942); O'Neil v. Build-
ing Service Union, 9 Wash. 2d 507, 115 P. 2d 662 (1941). But the
right is not an absolute grant of free speech and is subject to rea-
sonable limitation. For example, peaceful picketing is enjoinable
if carried on for an unlawful objective; Bakery Drivers Union v.
Wohl, supra; or if it lacks some rational nexus with the dispute;
Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942);
Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315
U.S. 740 (1942).
In spite of the identification of picketing as free speech by the
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United States Supreme Court, which has made the right to picket
a federal question, Ohio has continued to hold that a labor dispute
must exist in order to enjoy the right to picket peacefully. The
confused thinking of the Ohio courts may be traced directly to
Crosby v. Rath, supra, where the Supreme Court of Ohio sustained
an injunction and held that a trade dispute does not exist when
members of the picketing union are neither employees, nor former
employees. Since certiorari was denied by the United States
Supreme Court, Ohio courts have since placidly cited the Crosby
case as valid authority for enjoining peaceful picketing in the ab-
sence of a labor dispute. The record in the Crosby case is replete
with violence which would seem an adequate ground for an injunc-
tion even in view of later United States Supreme Court cases. Cf
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287
(1941). At least one Ohio case made such a distinction in permitting
peaceful picketing of a partnership having no employees. Evans v.
Retail Clerks' Union, 66 Ohio App. 158, 32 N.E. 2d 51 (1940).
The principal case significantly recognizes the limitation of the
power of a court to restrain picketing, but instead of completely
identifying picketing with free speech, curiously broadens the defini-
tion of "labor dispute" to include a controversy between a union
and an employer. ". . . it is the opinion of this court that the rule
announced by the Crosby case, to wit, that a labor dispute did not
exist in the absence of disagreement between an employer and its
employees is no longer valid . . ." 49 Ohio L. Abs. at 101, 75 N.E.
2d at 449.
The principal case by adopting this line of reasoning appears
to have misconstrued the Swing case, supra, for that case did not
purport to enlarge the scope of "labor dispute," but recognized the
right of free speech even in the absence of stich a dispute.
It is arguable that all future peaceful picketing should be en-
joined if there is a background of violence; or that if the isolated
acts of violence fall short of constituting such a background, no
restraint should be imposed. However, it is submitted that Judge
Griffin, in the principal case, is to be commended for placing limita-
tions on the future peaceful picketing in order that all parties may
be protected without destroying the right to picket peacefully. Ac-
cord, Isolantile, Inc. v. United Electrical Workers, 130 N.J. Eq. 506,
22 A. 2d 796 (1941). William B. Devaney, Jr.
LABOR LAW - INJUNCTION GRANTED EMPLOYER UNDER SECTION
303 OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947
The Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union had demanded that the
Schmidt Packing Co. recognize it as bargaining agent for at least
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those employees of Schmidt who were union members. The union
also demanded the reinstatement of several employees who had been
discharged allegedly because of union activities. When the com-
pany refused to acquiesce in the demands of the union, the union
called a strike and 11 of the company's 90 employees joined in the
walkout. The union maintained a picket line around the plant of
the employer and also around the places of business of some of
the employer's customers. There was no evidence of violence or
disorder. The Schmidt Packing Co. sought and received a tem-
porary restraining order in the court of common pleas. Held, on
defendants' motion to dissolve the restraining order, the union and
striking employees were properly restrained from picketing the
company's place of business, the places of business of the company's
customers, and from intimidating, coercing, or threatening em-
ployees of the plaintiff or customers of the plaintiff. Motion denied.
Schmidt Packing Co. v. Local No. 346, Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
21 LAB. REL. REP. (Lab. Rel. Ref. Man.) 2467 (Ohio C.P. Dec. 19,
1947).
In denying the defendants' motion the court predicated its
opinion on Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947, popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, and found that (a)
the company was engaged in interstate commerce and (b) that a
labor dispute in fact existed between the litigants.
Ohio has repeatedly held that a labor dispute exists where
there is a controversy, concerning terms and conditions of employ-
ment, between persons standing in the immediate relation of em-
ployer and employee. Crosby v. Rath, 136 Ohio St. 352, 25 N.E. 2d
934 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 690 (1941); La France Electrical
Co. v. International Electrical Workers, 108 Ohio St. 61, 140 N.E.
899 (1923); Lundoff-Bicknell Co. v. Smith, 24 Ohio App. 294, 156
N.E. 243 (1927); Wiley v. Retail Clerk Ass'n Union, 32 Ohio
N.P. (N.S.) 257 (1934) ; Note, 2 OHIO ST. L. J. 301 (1936). The federal
statutes, including the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Fair Labor Standards
Act, and the National Labor Relations Act have adopted a much
broader definition than the one adhered to in Ohio. The Labor-
Management Relations Act (LMRA) adopts the wording of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in defining a labor dispute as "any contro-
versy concerning terms or conditions of employment... regardless
of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee." The controversy in the principal case
between Schmidt and his employees would constitute a labor dis-
pute even under the narrow Ohio view and a fortiori would fall
within the broader concept adopted by the LMRA. Although the
finding in the principal case was couched in enigmatic language the
court apparently concluded that a trade dispute did exist, for it
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discussed United States Supreme Court decisions involving labor
disputes and relied upon the LMRA for portions of its opinion.
Where a valid labor dispute existed the Ohio courts heretofore
have always protected the right to picket peacefully. La France
Electrical Co. v. International Electrical Workers, supra;
Wiley v. Retail Clerk Ass'n Union, supra. The Supreme Court of
the United States has likewise afforded protection on the grounds
that peaceful picketing, in connection with a labor dispute, is an
exercise of the right of free speech. A. F. L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321
(1941). Under the LMRA certain labor practices enumerated in
Section 8 (b) (4) and reiterated in Section 303 (a) are declared un-
fair and when found to exist the Board is empowered under Section
10 to petition any district court of the United States for appropriate
temporary relief or restraining order to enjoin them. Certain of
these practices may involve peaceful picketing, and the language
of the Act would thus seem to permit the Board to seek an injunc-
tion against behaviors heretofore protected under the free speech
doctrine. The constitutionality of these provisions remains to be
determined.
In the principal case the court issued an injunction at the re-
quest of the employer, not of the Board. In so doing it relied upon
Section 303, paragraph (b) of which states, "Whoever shall be in-
jured . . . may sue . . . in any other court having jurisdiction of
the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained ....
During debate in the Senate on this section of the Taft-Hartley Act
four Senators advocated an amendment to provide injunctive relief
as well as suits for damages but this amendment was defeated and
no provision for injunctions was included in this section in the final
draft. Senator Taft, in repelling Senator Morse's fear that Section
303 might give rise to the granting of injunctions, replied, "Let me
say . . . that that [the granting of injunctive relief under Section
303] is not the intention of the author ... it is not his belief as to
the effect of it ... and it is not the advice of counsel to the com-
mittee." 93 CONG. REC. 5074 (1947). The Supreme Court of the
United States, in construing the Act, has taken cognizance of the
legislative intent by saying, " . . . the law has been changed only
where an injunction is sought by the National Labor Relations
Board, not where proceedings are instituted by a private party."
(Emphasis supplied.) Bakery Sales Drivers Union v. Wagshal, 68
Sup. Ct. 630, 632 (1948). Two recent cases denied the existence of
jurisdiction in such actions brought by interested parties. Amazon
Cotton Mill v. Textile Workers, 21 LAB. REL. REP. (Lab. Rel. Ref.
Man.) 2605 (C.C.A. 4th April 1, 1948); Gerry v. International Gar-
ment Workers, 21 LAB. REL. REP. (Lab. Rel. Ref. Man.) 2209 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 1948). Thus it would appear that injunctive
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relief should not be among the remedies available to the employer
under Section 303.
Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act it had been held permissible for
a union, having a grievance against a manufacturer, to picket a
retail establishment in which its products were sold, provided only
there was some "unity of interest" between the manufacturer and
the retailer. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. 2d 910
(1937); People v. Briesblatt, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 184 (Sup. Ct. 1942). Sec-
tions 8 (b) (4) (A) and 303 (a) (1) of the LIRA read, "It shall be
unlawful... for any labor organization to engage in... a strike
... where an object thereof is forcing or requiring any employer
... or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting,
or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, proc-
essor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person." The term "any employer" would include the plaintiff,
but the behavior precluded under this section has not been directed
against Schmidt but rather against Schmidt's customers. It was
not an objective of the strike to force the plaintiff to cease han-
dling the products of another person; rather it was to force the
plaintiff's customers to cease dealing with Schmidt. A committee
report embracing this section included the following example of
those practices outlawed: "It would be unlawful for a union to
boycott employer A because employer A uses or otherwise deals
in the goods of or does business with employer B (with whom the
union has a dispute)." Report No. 104, Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947). As the example
given seems to duplicate the fact pattern presented in the principal
case it would appear that the defendants' picketing of the plaintiff's
customers' places of business now constitutes an illegal boycott
under the two quoted sections. The analysts for the Bureau of
National Affairs and Prentice-Hall concur that such a practice
would be enjoinable under the Act. Thus undoubtedly this par-"
ticular phase of the picketing would be enjoinable at the instiga-
tion of the Board as being in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A). Also
the plaintiff apparently could recover the damages sustained as a
result of.the secondary boycott as per Section 303 (b), but in seek-
ing an injunction Schmidt was mistaken as to the proper remedy
and the court was in error in taking jurisdiction.
The second part of the decree in the principal case enjoined
the employees from picketing their own employer's place of busi-
ness. Here the court relied on Section 303 (a) (2) of the LMRA
which reads, "It shall be unlawful... for any labor organization to
engage in . .. a strike . . . where an object thereof is forcing or
requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization ... unless such labor organization has been certified
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as the representative of such employees under . . .Section 9 of
the National Labor Relations Act." (Emphasis supplied.) The logi-
cal conclusion is that the phrase "any other employer" embraces
all employers except the employees' own. Especially is this true
when read in conjunction with Section 303 (a) (3) which says, "It
shall be unlawful... for any labor organization to engage in ...
a strike.., where an object thereof is forcing or requiring any em-
ployer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization
as the representative of his employees if another labor organization
has been certified as the representative of such employees under
... Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) The Senate report on Sections 8 (b) (4) (B) and 303 (a) (2)
comments, "It is intended to reach strikes and boycotts conducted
for the purpose of forcing another employer to recognize or bargain
with a labor organization that has not been certified as the exclu-
sive representative. It is to be observed that the primary strike
for recognition (without a Board certification) is not proscribed."
SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st. Sess. 22 (1947). This latter sen-
tence, describing exactly the fact situation in the case at bar, would
therefore preclude any relief against the employees' picketing of
their own employer's place of business. Since no other union was
involved Section 303 (a) (3) cannot be relied upon to extend relief
to the plaintiff. Neither would Section 303 (a) (2) apply since the
union was not making demands of another employer but rather of
the employees' own employer.
None of the other provisions of the LMRA would seem to deter
the defendants in the exercise of their right to picket peacefully.
Section 13 of the Act states, "Nothing in this act, except as specifi-
cally provided for herein, shall be construed so as to either interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to
affect the-limitations or qualifications on that right." "Except as
provided for herein" refers to the unfair labor practices listed in
Section 8 (b) (4) and restated in Section 303 (a).
That the court lacked the authority to enjoin the peaceful
picketing of the plaintiff's place of business under the Ohio law
seems apparent. La France Electrical Co. v. International Electrical
Workers, supra; Wiley v. Retail Clerk Ass'n Union, supra. That
no such authority has been conferred by the Taft-Hartley Act
seems equally irrefutable when the legislative history and judicial




PATENTS -DiscovERy OF THE PHENOMEN=A OF NATURE
Plaintiff sued for infringement of a patent issued for a bacteria
culture; defendant counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that
the patent be adjudged invalid. Held, patents cannot be issued for
the discovery of the phenomena of nature; as such the patent is
invalid for want of invention. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inocu-
lant Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 440 (1948).
Leguminous plants take nitrogen from the air and fix it in the
plant for conversion to organic compounds. The ability of these
plants to take nitrogen from the air depends on the presence of
Rhizobia bacteria which infect and form nodules on the roots of
the plant. There are at least six species of Rhizobia bacteria, each
of which will infect only a particular plant.
Prior to the instant discovery, inoculants contained only one
species of bacteria because the species when mixed produced an in-
hibitory effect on each other. Bond, the patentee, successfully com-
bined several species to form a mixed culture capable of inoculating
all leguminous plants and obtained a patent for his discovery.
To be patentable, the final product must be properly classifiable
as an invention or discovery of a new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter. REv. STAT. §4886 (2d ed.
1878), as amended, 35 U.S.C. §31 (1940). The issue in this case was
whether the patent constituted a "composition of matter" within
the contemplation- of the patent laws, or whether the patent claim
was directed merely to a natural element per se. A discovery of the
properties of nature per se is not patentable. De Forest Radio Co.
v. General Electric Co., 283 U.S. 664, 684 (1931); Le Roy v. Tatham,
14 How. 156, 175 (U.S. 1852).
It has been said that "composition of matter" presupposes a
combination of elements. Dennis v. Pitner, 106 F. 2d 142 (C.C.A.
7th 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 606 (1939). However, a true "ag-
gregation" of independent elements is unpatentable if each element
performs its same function. Richards v. Chase Elevator Co., 158
U.S. 299, 302 (1895). The association of a rubber eraser on a lead
pencil is not patentable because their is no joint operation. Recken-
dorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 358 (1875). With reference to the com-
bination of a washing machine and wringer it was said that merely
bringing old devices into juxtaposition and allowing each to work
out its own effect without the production of something novel is not
invention. Grinnell Washing Machine Co. v. Johnson Co., 247 U.S.
426, 432 (1918). Acord, Siekert & Baum Stationery Co. v. Station-
ers Loose Leaf Co., 51 F. 2d 326, 328 (C.C.A. 7th 1931).
The law of nature defense may be sustained when the patent
claim is directed to a natural element, or product, without more.
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If, however, the invention is a natural element to be used for a
new and useful end, there is authority to uphold the patent. Tele-
phone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534 (1887) (Patent claim was upheld for
putting a continuous current of electricity into a specified condition
and using it in that condition, although electricity was used in its
natural state). Accord, Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Sara-
toga Springs, 159 Fed. 453 (C.C.A. 2d 1908). Similarly, a scientific
truth is not a patentable invention, but a novel and useful structure
created with the aid of scientific truth may be. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).
The court in the instant case was content to invalidate the
Bond patent by saying that it was a discovery of a phenomenon of
nature and as such was not patentable. Le Roy v. Tatham, supra.
However, the court did recognize those cases which upheld patents
of a law of nature discovery when the patents were to be used for
new and useful ends. Telephone Cases, supra. The court thought
that a new result was lacking here when they said, "Each of the
species of . . . bacteria ... infects the same group of leguminous
plants which it always infected. . . . The combination of species
produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species of bacteria,
and no enlargement of the range of their utility .... They serve
the ends nature originally provided and act quite independently of
any effort of the patentee." Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co., 68 Sup. Ct. 440, 442 (1948).
It would seem that the court could have invalidated the patent
by an analogy to the "aggregation cases." If it be true that each of
the bacterial species functions independently of the other, then the
patent is probably one of the rare cases of a true aggregation with
an independency of action such as the lead and the rubber of a
pencil. Reckendorfer v. Faber, supra. However, it is submitted
that the patent might have been upheld as a discovery which ful-
fills a new and useful end. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio
Corp. of America, supra. Bond's mixture has the new property of
multi-service applicability; the multi-service feature is of great im-
portance to the farmer in eliminating the need of a different in-
oculant for each plant, and to the dealer in decreasing his inventory.
Charles M. Deitle
TORTS - DEFAMATION - CENSORSHIP OF POLITICAL BROADCAST
Air time was contracted for by several caAdidates for political
speeches. After reading one of the scripts, the station canceled the
broadcasts through fear of being sued for defamation. The candi-
dates lodged a complaint before the Federal Communication Coin-
[Vol. 9
RECENT DECISIONS
mission to have the station's license revoked for illegal cens&rship
under Section 315 of the, Communications Act (48 STAT. 1088 (1934),
47 U.S.C. §315 (1940). Held, license renewed. Port Huron Broadcast-
ing Co., F.C.C. Docket No. 6987, Jan. 30, 1948.
Although the Commission found that the station's act of can-
celing the broadcast was a violation of Section 315 which reads, "If
any licensee shall permit ... a candidate to use a broadcasting sta-
tion.. . such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the ma-
terial broadcast," it reasoned that revocation of the license was not
justified in view of the good faith of the station and the prior un-
settled state of the law concerning this provision. See Guider,
Liability for Defamation in Political Broadcasts, 2 J. RADIo L. 708
(1932). Before deciding that the station was guilty of illegal censor-
ship, the Commission felt constrained to point out that a radio sta-
tion was relieved from liability for defamation in a political broad-
cast. It was this pronouncement that brought forth a separate and
vigorous opinion by Commissioner Jones.
In the leading case on radio defamation, a broadcasting station,
subsequent to the passage of Section 315, was held liable for defama-
tory statements uttered by a political speaker. Sorensen v. Wood, 123
Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), appeal dismissed, 290 U.S. 599 (1933).
The rationale of this decision was that the statutory provision pro-
hibiting censorship merely prevents the licensee from censoring
words as to their political and partisan trend, and does not give the
station the privilege of joining and assisting in the publication of
libel. Liability was based on the analogy between radio stations
and newspapers. But see MOSER AND LEVIn, RADIO ANM THE LAW, 80
(1947); Guider, Liability for' Defamation in Political Broadcasts,
supra, at 713. The Commission in the instant hearing rejected this
analogy and used instead that of the telegraph, feeling that the in-
ability on the part of the station to censor material puts them in
the same position as a telegraph company which must accept all
messages. O'Brien v. Western Union Teleg. Co., 113 F. 2d 539
(C.C.A. 1st 1940); Gray v. Western Union Teleg. Co., 87 Ga. 350, 13
S.E. 562 (1891).
The only other case found on this express problem held that a
corresponding qualified privilege against liability should go along
with the censorship aspect of the act. Josephson v. Knickerbocker
Broadcasting Co., 38 N.Y.S. 2d 985, 179 Misc. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
The legislative history of Section 315 is illuminating. It was
taken over without change from Section 18 of the Radio Act of
1927 (44 STAT. 1162). The Senate draft of Section 18 contained a
prohibition against both censorship and liability for defamation.
See H.R. 9971, §4, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., with Senate amendments
(1926). The latter was dropped without reason in the final bill.
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H.R. REP. No. 1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1927). Suggestions for
curing this alleged deficiency have been advanced periodically but
nothing has been done to modify the act. See Hearings before Com-
mittee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2910, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 63,
66-67 (1934).
Recent state statutes have adopted a more liberal approach to
the question. See MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §5692.1 (Supp. 1939); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §770.03 (1944); IOWA CODE §659.5 (1946). The most re-
cent act is the Illinois statute which renders absolute the station's
immunity to the consequences of the remarks of a political speaker.
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, §404.2 (Supp. 1947).
The Communications Act of 1934 gives the FCC broad regu-
latory powers over radio. See Comment, 12 Am L. REV. 372 (1941).
This power has been liberally interpreted by the Supreme Court.
See Barber, Competition, Free Speech and FCC Radio Network
Regulations, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 34 (1943). But in this hearing as
Commissioner Jones pointed out, there was no issue of defamation
before the Commission and such determination was dictum.
Norman W. Shibley
TORTS-DISCIPLINARY ACTION BY RELIGIOUS SOCIETY AS INFRINGEMENT
OF CIVIL LIBERTY
Plaintiff had been a member of the Old Amish Church, but
had withdrawn and joined a more liberal congregation. Soon after
his withdrawal he bought an automobile to transport his infant
daughter to a doctor. The purchase of the automobile was deemed
a violation of the Articles of Faith of the Old Amish Church, which
forbids members to use more modern means of transportation than
a horse and buggy. The Old Church imposed a "mite" upon plain-
tiff, even though he was no longer a member of their society. Every
member of the old order was compelled to shun the plaintiff or be
"mited" himself. The plaintiff, contending that the boycott violated
his civil rights, sought to have it enjoined, and asked $40,000 dam-
ages. Held, injunction granted and $5,000 damages awarded. Yoder
v. Helmuth, Ohio C. P., Wayne Co., Nov. 7, 1947.
A boycott is a combination formed to make good a threat of in-
jury against a party unless he yield to the desires of the con-
spirators. Dick v. Northern Pacific Ry., 86 Wash. 211, 150 Pac. 8
(1915).
The Ohio courts do not deny that upon questions of the disci-
pline of members arising under a given religious code, such as the
Articles of Faith of the Amish Church, the decisions of the church
are ordinarily final. Ginerich v. Swartzentruber, 22 Ohio N.P.
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(N.S.) 1 (1919); Harrison v. Hoyle, 24 Ohio St. 254 (1873). How-
ever, acts "evil in their nature," or dangerous to the public welfare,
will be forbidden and punished as a violation of the civil law
though sanctioned by one or more religions. State v. Marble, 72
Ohio St. 21, 73 N.E. 1063 (1905); Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387
(1853).
Even if the plaintiff had remained a member of the Old Amish
Church, it would seem that the disciplinary measures reached un-
lawful extremes. Certainly, the Ohio courts have made it clear that
the basic concept of religious freedom includes the right of the in-
dividual to believe whatever he wishes and the right to withdraw
from one church and join another. Ginerich v. Swartzentruber,
supra.
Under no circumstances can a religious group be permitted to
resort to concerted action in derogation of an individual's civil
rights. It seems evident that the "mite" was an intentional and co-
ercive interference with the plaintiff's right to be unmolested in
business and society, and was, therefore, properly enjoined.
Charles E. Westervelt, Jr.
TRUSTS-BENEFICIARY'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE BETWEEN
ANNuITY AND LAND
The settlor established a testamentary trust whereby the trus-
tee was empowered to manage, lease or sell five parcels of real
estate. Each of the beneficiaries was to receive income from one
particular parcel of land. The settlor further provided that if the
trustee in the exercise of his discretionary power should sell a
parcel he was to purchase with the proceeds of the sale an annuity
for the beneficiary who had been deriving income from that parcel.
The trust was limited to a period of fifteen years of which six years
remain. Two of the beneficiaries sought to obtain the fee simple
title in their particular parcels of land. Held, the beneficiaries can-
not have fee simple title in the land because it is the res of an active
trust which the settlor intended should run for six more years.
Feiler v. Feiler, 149 Ohio St. 17, 77 N.E. 2d 237 (1948).
The interesting phase of the litigation is the decision rendered
by the court of appeals. 48 Ohio L. Abs. 262, 74 N.E. 2d 384 (1947).
That court held that the beneficiaries could not have the land, be-
cause the settlor intended that the beneficiaries should have the an-
nuities which were to be purchased from the proceeds of the land
sale.
1948]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The beneficiaries were seeking the land rather than the annui-
ties which were to be purchased for them according to the intent of
the settlor, if and when the trustee chose to sell the land. In cases
where the settlor has directed that the land be sold and the proceeds
given to the beneficiary most courts have permitted the beneficiary
to take the land. Ohio has recognized this equitable conversion
doctrine. See Holt v. Lamb, 17 Ohio St. 374 (1867). When the-
trust instrument has directed an anuuity be purchased for the bene-
ficiary, most courts have permitted the beneficiary to take the cash
in lieu of the annuity. Barnes v. Rowley, 3 Vesey Jr. 305, 30 Eng.
Rep. 1024 (1797), In Re Brunning, 1 Ch. 276, 78 L.J. Ch. 75, 99 L.T.
918 (1909), In Re Robbins, 2 Ch. 8, 76 L.J. Ch. N.S. 53 (1907), Parker
v. Cobe, 208 Mass. 260, 94 N.E. 476 (1916), Reid v. Brown, 54 Misc.
481, 106 N.Y. Supp. 27 (1907). The New York legislature has
changed the rule of its court decisions by a statute which requires
that the annuity be purchased if such was directed by the settlor.
N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW §476. In those jurisdictions where the
beneficiary may take the land instead of the cash and where he can
take the cash instead of the annuity, it would seem to follow logi-
cally that he could take the land instead of the annuity.
The reason given for permitting the beneficiary to take the land
instead of the cash from the sale is that ordinarily the beneficiary,
if given the money, can purchase the land and thus render nugatory
the sale of the land. The courts will not compel the performance
of circuitous acts. The same reason is given for permitting the
beneficiary to take the cash instead of the annuity. But ordinarily
an annuity cannot be sold for the same amount that was used to
purchase it. The person purchasing an annuity from the beneficiary
will probably do so at a discount to compensate for the risk in-
volved, i.e., the duration of the beneficiary's life. Therefore the
similarity in the two situations fails because the beneficiary, while
receiving an equal value by taking the land or the cash, would get
a greater value by taking the cash instead of the annuity.
Another aspect of this problem and perhaps the one most to be
considered in Ohio is the matter of the intent of the settlor. In
those jurisdictions which permit a departure from the express in-
tent of the settlor it would seem logical that they would permit
such an election between an annuity and the cash. In England, one
who has the sole equitable interest and is sui juris, may terminate
the trust prior to the time designated by the settlor. Saunders v.
Vautier, 4 Beav. 115 (1841). Hence where the testator directed
that the annuitant shall not be entitled to the value of the annuity
and that if he sought to sell it, it was to cease and revert, the English
court held that the annuitant was entitled to the sum if he so chose.
Hunt-Foulston v. Furber, 3 L.R: Ch. Div. 285, 24 Week Rep. 756
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(1876); Stokes v. Cheek, 28 Beav. 620, 29 L.J. Ch. N.S. 922 (1860).
But in America, the indestructible trust doctrine is upheld by most
courts. Ciaflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889); Stier v.
Nashville Trust Co., 158 Fed. 601 (C.C.A. 6th 1908); Jourolman v.
Massingill, 86 Tenn. 81, 5 S.W. 719 (1887); White, Indestructible
Trusts in Ohio, 2 U. OF Cin. L. REv. 333 (1928). Since the intent of
the settlor is stressed and held to be all-controlling in those cases,
it should likewise be stressed in the matter of purchasing an an-
nuity.
Ohio has emphasized the importance of following the intent and
wishes of the settlor so long as they do not contravene public policy.
Union Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Alter, 103 Ohio St. 188, 132 N.E.
834 (1921). The annuity is comparable to a trust in that the bene-
ficiary derives income periodically from a sum of money or
property set aside for that purpose. Undoubtedly the settlor in-
tends to have the beneficiary well provided for, whether it be by
trust or by annuity. Thus, if and when this problem of election
arises before the Ohio Supreme Court, it well may carry out the
intent of the settlor and deny the beneficiary the right to elect be-
tween an annuity and cash and also, deny the right to have land in
lieu of an annuity.
Jack W. Folkerth
Wn.Ls-CoNsTRucTioN Or AMBIGUoUs DEVISFE-FEE SIMPLE
OR LIFE ESTATE?
Testatrix was beneficiary of her sister's will, which read in part:
... the balance of my estate both real and personal of every de-
scription be given to my sister, ... to do with and use as she sees
best fit to do. And after her death what is left if any be given to
my nephew's children." Plaintiffs are the nephew's children and
claim as remaindermen under the clause; defendant is testatrix'
husband, executor and residuary devisee. Plaintiffs contend that
the first taker (the testatrix) 'took only a life estate with a power
of disposition under the clause under construction. Defendant con-
tends first taker took a fee and that plaintiffs took nothing, the at-
tempted limitation over being void. Held, first taker received a life
estate with a power to consume for her benefit. DeWolf v. Frazier,
80 Ohio App. 150, 73 N.E. 2d 212 (1947).
The case is in accord with the Ohio line of authority in constru-
ing an ambiguous devise with an accompanying power as a devise
of a life estate. Baxter v. Bowyer, 19 Ohio St. 490 (1866); Johnson
v. Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 446, 38 N.E. 61 (1894); Robbins v. Smith, 72
Ohio St. 1. 73 N.E. 1051 (1905); Fetter v. Rettig, 98 Ohio St. 428, 121
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N.E. 696 (1918); Raymund v. Williams, 100 Ohio St. 544, 127 N.E.
925 (1919); Tax Commission v. Oswald, 109 Ohio St. 36, 141 N.E. 678
(1923); Murphy v. Widows' Home and Asylum, 21 Ohio App. 174,
151 N.E. 783 (1925).
Baxter v. Bowyer, supra, is a leading case for the proposition
that a devise in general terms, which by itself would be sufficient
to pass a fee, vests only a life estate where a gift over of a remainder
follows the primary devise. At the time the Baxter case was de-
cided, the leading cases in the field held, under similar fact situa-
tions, that the devise was of a fee, and that the attempted limitation
over was void. Jackson, ex dem. Brewster v. Bull, 10 Johnson 19
(N.Y. 1813); Jackson, ex dem. Livingston v. Robins, 16 Johnson 537
(N.Y. 1819). The court in the Baxter case justified their decision
on a slight distinction between the words of the grant of the re-
mainder in the Ohio situation and those of the instruments under
construction in New York. The court stated that the words "all the
property remaining" in the Baxter will imported considerably less
control of the property by the first taker than did the words "such
part of the estate as ... (the devisee) ... chose to leave" in the two
New York cases, and therefore held that the Baxter will conveyed
only a life estate to the first beneficiary. This fine distinction has
apparently never been made by courts in other states and has not
been made, by the courts of Ohio in subsequent cases, although the
courts have uniformly reached the same result as did the court in
the Baxter case.
Later Ohio cases, in determining the nature of the estate de-
vised have relied on several intrinsic factors. If the words of the
devise state specifically "for life," there is, of course, no problem. If
the devise is in general terms, the presence and nature of any power
of disposition of the subject matter is significant, but not controlling.
Where the estate given is not accompanied by any power of disposi-
tion, it is generally held that the devise is one of a fee simple and
that any attempted limitation over is void. Steuer v. Steuer, 8 Ohio
C.C. (N.S.) 71, 28 Ohio C.C. 145 (1905) ; Trumbull v. Stentz, 30 Ohio
App. 34, 164 N.E. 57 (1929) ; Krumm v. Cuneo, 71 Ohio App. 521, 47
N.E. 2d 1001 (1942). Also, where the estate given is accompanied
by an unlimited and unrestricted power of absolute disposition of
the subject matter of the devise, it is generally held that the devise
is one of a fee simple, and that any attempted limitation over is
void. Wells v. Brown, 167 C.C.A. 180, 255 Fed. 852 (1919); Eubank
v. Smiley, 130 Ind. 393, 29 N.E. 919 (1892); Kelley v. Meins, 135
Mass. 231 (1883); Helmer v. Shoemaker, 22 Wend. 137 (N.Y. 1879).
In only one instance have the courts of Ohio construed the accom-
panying power as being unlimited and unrestricted and in that case
the estate had been conveyed by the first taker in her lifetime,
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Widows' Home v. Lippardt, 70 Ohio St. 261, 71' N.E. 770 (1904).
Where the power of disposition in the first taker is limited as to its
exercise-e.g., a power to dispose of in any manner she choose ex-
cept by will-the devise is construed as one of a life estate only.
Tuthill v. Davis,. 121 App. Div. 290, 105 N.Y. Supp. 672 (2d Dep't
1907) ; Johnson v. Johnson, supra; Tax Commission v. Oswald, supra;
Murphy v. Widows' Home and Asylum, supra.
The Johnson case, supra, exemplifies the reluctance of the Ohio
courts to invalidate a remainder over in the face of a power of dis-
position in the first taker. In that case, the power was described
in the will as "full power to bargain, sell, convey, exchange or
dispose of as she may think proper." The court held that the devisee
was limited as to the exercise of the power to the consumption of the
property during her lifetime. The court cited Baxter v. Bowyer but
made no mention of the distinction in wording discussed earlier.
Since the Johnson case, the courts have tended to infer from the
presence of any power that the intention of the testator was to grant
a limited power of consumption during the lifetime of the first
taker, and thus have validated otherwise meaningless gifts over to
successive remaindermen.
Myron E. Reinman
1948]

